April 2015

Yesterday the SEC issued its long-awaited “pay-versus-performance” rule proposal. The rules would add a new paragraph (v) to Item 402 of Regulation S-K. In short, the proposed rules would require a new table comparing “executive compensation actually paid” to the “total shareholder return” (TSR) of the company and its peers, as well as a discussion of the relationship between these amounts.

Here is a quick summary of the main requirements of the proposal:Continue Reading SEC Proposes “Pay-Versus-Performance” Rules

In light of the SEC’s first enforcement action against a company for impeding whistleblower activity in violation of Rule 21F-17, employers may wish to consider clarifying in their agreements, policies and practices that involve confidentiality obligations that employees may provide truthful information to the SEC or other governmental agencies concerning potential violations of law.

Rule 21F-17, adopted pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, provides in relevant part:

(a) No person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement … with respect to such communications.

KBR, a Houston-based global technology and engineering firm, had a practice of conducting internal investigations in response to complaints regarding potential illegal or unethical conduct, which included interviewing employees (including those who had lodged a complaint). KBR required witnesses in these internal investigations to sign a confidentiality statement that included the following language:

I understand that in order to protect the integrity of this review, I am prohibited from discussing any particulars regarding this interview and the subject matter discussed during the interview, without the prior authorization of the Law Department. I understand that the unauthorized disclosure of information may be grounds for disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.

The SEC acknowledged that it was not aware of any employee in fact being prevented from communicating directly with SEC staff, or of KBR taking any action to enforce these confidentiality statements. Nevertheless, the SEC concluded that that the language in the confidentiality statement impeded communications with the SEC staff about potential securities violations by requiring permission from KBR’s legal department or face the prospect of discipline.
Continue Reading Carefully Draft NDAs to Avoid Whistleblower Concerns

We have previously blogged about the SEC’s July 2013 rule change that disqualifies certain “bad actors” from using Rule 506. Thankfully, Rule 506 permits the SEC to determine, upon a showing of good cause, that it is not necessary under the circumstances to deny availability of Rule 506. The SEC has recently issued a policy statement explaining how it will evaluate whether a party seeking a waiver has shown good cause that it is not necessary under the circumstances that the exemptions be denied.

Background

Other securities offering exemptions, including Rule 505 and Regulation A, have had bad actor disqualifications for many years, and the SEC has also had the authority to grant waivers under these exemptions using a similar “good cause” standard. In fact, based on this interesting article from Urska Velikonja, the SEC granted waivers nearly 200 times between July 2003 and December 2014. However, because Rule 506 is so much more widely used in mainstream private securities offerings, significant attention to waivers of bad actor disqualifications emerged as the first waivers were granted under Rule 506 (such as those granted to Oppenheimer and H.D. Vest). The attention to the issue culminated in several SEC commissioners publicly expressing diverging views about the proper use of waivers, including in speeches by SEC Commissioners Daniel Gallagher, Kara Stein and Michael Piwowar and SEC Chair Mary Jo White. This ultimately led to the SEC issuing its recent policy statement to bring consistency to how such waivers are granted, whether under Regulation A, Rule 505 or Rule 506.
Continue Reading Factors the SEC Considers in “Bad Actor” Waivers